The ARHS Bulletin, December 1950; pp129-31 provides details of this incident supplied by C T Blimm, NSWGR Chief Traffic Manager.

Run 45 - comprising (from the front) C3319, T4379, T4123, C3465, C3412, T4204, T4420, C3067 - collided with the rear of Run 108 - comprising (from the front) C3298, T4104, T4397, C3290, C3475, T4221, T4347, C3188 - on the down North Shore line south of Lindfield station. Shortly afterwards Run 123 on the up Shore line came into contact with the derailed cars on the other track, Run 123 comprising C3354, T4529, T4110, C3152, C3296, T4418, T4284, C3408. Car C3188 was withdrawn from service and condemned in October 1950, the first steel electric car in the Sydney fleet to be condemned. T4347 was also withdrawn from service, but not condemned until February 1965.

The other 22 cars involved in this incident went back into service, although the wooden trailers had shorter lives than the steel cars.

The ARHS Bulletin, December 1950; pp129-31 provides details of this incident supplied by C T Blimm, NSWGR Chief Traffic Manager.

Run 45 collided with the rear of Run 108 on the down North Shore line south of Lindfield station. Shortly afterwards Run 123 on the up Shore line came into contact with the derailed cars on the other track

That was a significant event and could have been far worse. It's something Sydney Trains people should remember.

That was a significant event and could have been far worse. It's something Sydney Trains people should remember.

That's why they have dets.

Oh! Wait a minute!

That's why they have dets.

Oh! Wait a minute!

LOL Roseville did cross my mind when writing about dets, not that I am claiming they could have prevented it.

LOL Roseville did cross my mind when writing about dets, not that I am claiming they could have prevented it.

Because pushing the "Emergency" button in the train radio wouldn't cause signaller to put the Lindfield and Chatswood controlled signals to be put at stop... By the time you put dets down, you'd have walked to both Chatswood and Lindfield anyway.

Because pushing the "Emergency" button in the train radio wouldn't cause signaller to put the Lindfield and Chatswood controlled signals to be put at stop... By the time you put dets down, you'd have walked to both Chatswood and Lindfield anyway.

As I said, I'm not claiming that dets would have prevented Roseville. The train radio may not have, either, not that they were available in 1950. There simply isn't always time to prevent a secondary collision into a derailed/foul wreckage.

And by the way, merely pushing the EM button on the radio does not cause signallers to throw signals back... That's not the procedure, nor is it necessarily even possible to do.

As I said, I'm not claiming that dets would have prevented Roseville. The train radio may not have, either, not that they were available in 1950. There simply isn't always time to prevent a secondary collision into a derailed/foul wreckage.

I'm not saying it would have prevented it back then, I'm suggesting that using an accident from 1950 as an example for keeping detonators on trains in 2013 is a very, very long bow to draw, and indicates the weakness of the argument to begin with.

And by the way, pushing the EM button on the radio does not cause signallers to throw signals back...

I'm not saying it would. I'm saying that it would be a far more suitable way to alert people to the derailment than walking a good ten km round trip to place protection.

I'm not saying it would have prevented it back then, I'm suggesting that using an accident from 1950 as an example for keeping detonators on trains in 2013 is a very, very long bow to draw, and indicates the weakness of the argument to begin with.

That is why I didn't use it. All I said was that it crossed my mind.

However, the fact that an accident or type of incident has not occurred for a long time has no relationship to the possibility of future occurrences. Roseville could happen again. Would dets or radios help? Not if the third train was already very close when the initial rear-ender occurred. It's a very unfortunate thing, but at Roseville they were very lucky.

That is why I didn't use it. All I said was that it crossed my mind.

...so why bring it up here, in this thread, which has nothing to do with detonators at all?

EDIT: Nevermind that comment, you didn't bring detonators into the conversation to begin with. I don't know why that discussion needs to go beyond the original thread to begin with...

Didn't the driver of the second train (no. 45) claim he suffered a fit of coughing?

The body damage to T4347 was fairly extensive as this car wedged itself inside C3188.

Some other items of interest - C3465 survived not only to be remotored (and renumbered to C7465) but it is thought to now be the only intact 1940-type Tulloch motor car.

C3067 became the first Bradfield motor car to be rebuilt to a format similar to Standard motor cars.

The body damage to T4347 was fairly extensive as this car wedged itself inside C3188.

Some other items of interest - C3465 survived not only to be remotored (and renumbered to C7465) but it is thought to now be the only intact 1940-type Tulloch motor car.

C3067 became the first Bradfield motor car to be rebuilt to a format similar to Standard motor cars.

Are there any photos of this crash or the damaged vehicles?

C3475 was also renumbered to C7475.

C3475 was also renumbered to C7475.

thanks. that was one I overlooked.

Are there any photos of this crash or the damaged vehicles?

The only photos I've come across are the Departmental shots of T4347 side view (not included in article) and that of T4347 telescoped into C3188 (included with the article), plus the brief newseel footage of the incident.

It is possible that the anticipated deliveries of Tulloch motor cars C3477, C3478 & C3479 in 1951 brought about the decision to condemn C3188. Similarly, additional Tulloch trailers were also expected in 1951.

AIUI, Run 108 was a terminating train, waiting at either the Down Accept, or Down Home, waiting for an earlier terminating train to clear Platform 2 at Lindfield.

Run 45 tripped past the Down Auto signal at Roseville.

The line has a gentle righthand curve, mostly on an embankment, with a reasonable view of the line ahead, and probably run 108. The driver's cabin is helpfully on the left hand side.

99.999% of the time, a driver leaving a station accelerates to normal speed, and it would be very easy on this occasion (0.001% of the time) for the driver to forget that he has tripped past that Down Auto and must take extreme care.

This is rather similar to the Glenbrook IP-Interurban collision which occurred on a sharp blind left hand curve. The driver's cabin here is unhelpfully on the left hand side.

By and large there would have been no time to set detonators.

What might have been helpful would have been something like the British "Driver's Reminder Device" which the driver sets at a platform when facing a red signal. The DRD disables the traction motors, so that a mistaken bell-to-start signal from the guard doesn't prompt the driver to start against that red signal. A NSW Driver's reminder device would be set when a train trips past a red signal such as at Roseville and Glenbrook and limits speed to a safe drive-on-sight speed.

This thread does not seem to say what speed run 45 climbed up to, or the Glenbrook interurban, for that matter.

I can remember being taken on to the Clanville Road bridge and being held up by my father to peer over the grey painted corrugated iron bridge fencing to look at stationary trains in the distance. Of course I was only two years old at the time....

Run 123 was in fact the train departing the terminating road in Lindfield, and thus the train for which Run 108 was waiting.

It was widely said at the time that Run 123 was almost empty, not only because it started from Lindfield but because the station staff had set the indicators incorrectly and most passengers were waiting on the through platform for the next train rather than boarding the terminating train involved in the crash. Thus all three trains had very few passengers during the morning peak, since two were down trains and the one up service had very few passengers thanks to the indicator setting.

A friend's mother was standing at the kitchen sink washing up after breakfast, and looking out towards the railway line at the point of the collision and observed the crash. She yelled to her husband in the hallway just leaving for Roseville station, "Wally, don't bother going to the station, there won't be a train for some time..."

M636C

It was widely said at the time that Run 123 was almost empty, not only because it started from Lindfield but because the station staff had set the indicators incorrectly and most passengers were waiting on the through platform for the next train rather than boarding the terminating train involved in the crash. Thus all three trains had very few passengers during the morning peak, since two were down trains and the one up service had very few passengers thanks to the indicator setting.

An Overhead Wiring Mast near where the collision occurred show a slight twist where a derailed train may have hit it. This damaged mast disappeared when the OHW was renewed in total a few years ago.

Lindfield station had a movable "Next Train to City" sign at the top of the ramp on the eastern side. This sign was operated by a wire 10m long from where the station assistant worked the four-sided slate indicators, this avoiding a 2x10m walk.