People injured after train crash at Richmond Station

 
Topic moved from News by bevans on 22 Jan 2018 10:50
  s3_gunzel Not a gunzel developer

Location: Western Sydney, AU
3 cars from A42 (the back three, in regards to the accident) have been moved today behind 8046, to Cardiff as far as I know. The rest of the train is still at Richmond. In pieces.

When I was at Richmond on Wednesday, they were working to divide the train up, but hadn't quite gotten there yet.

Missed the chance to get a photo this morning by about two minutes.

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  RTT_Rules Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Dubai UAE
No nothing on how ATP works but surely the train can track itself using GPS and by having preprogramed speed limits for the track like road based mobile apps have for cars then take over and apply auto braking if speed is exceeded?
  Matthew Train Controller

This safety feature would be similar to a system known as Automatic Train Protection (ATP).

This system was, of recent times, being trialled on the Blue Mountains line using a specially equipped Intercity V set, together with approapriate devices placed along the track. The system was to ensure that the train did not exceed the maximum speed in accordance with the Signalling aspect for the section ahead.
scott4570

It's also been put on the main lines between Wolli Creek and Hurstville. The Balise are all the fixed type to locate the train within a block. The movement authority is transmitted by secure radio. (ETCS, Level 2)
Some of the other trials used Balise connected to line side equipment so they could transmit signal indications.  For the Illawarra trial, they are all the fixed code type.

Such ATP is where the future lies if the railways actually settle on what variant of ETCS they will deploy.
  simstrain Chief Commissioner

I wonder what the 'Skid Distance' is for the current fleet of Suburban rolling stock is?

Once past this 'Stop', there is still nothing to stop a Driver from opening the 'throttle' if he/she was of a mind too.

Not inconceivable when you consider the missing flight MH370 and that Pilot who waited until the Captain left the cockpit and dove into a mountain.
Committing suicide by driving a Train into a set of Stop blocks at 20 KPH isnt likely to succeed but People can do weird things during a mental episode.
As an additional safety feature, I am sure there are electronics available today that once passing a 'location', it would not allow the Train to increase its speed and could monitor the speed and if its too high, cut the power also applying the Brakes if this is not already being done so by the Driver.
This would only need to be functional at Dead ends and maybe where Derails turn a Train into an unsafe area.
gordon_s1942

Why are you so intent on blaming the driver in this instance when from early reports there was a significant mechanical failure.
The waratahs are ATP capable in any case and how about you wait for the final report before apportioning any more blame to the driver.
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

I wonder what the 'Skid Distance' is for the current fleet of Suburban rolling stock is?

Once past this 'Stop', there is still nothing to stop a Driver from opening the 'throttle' if he/she was of a mind too.

Not inconceivable when you consider the missing flight MH370 and that Pilot who waited until the Captain left the cockpit and dove into a mountain.
Committing suicide by driving a Train into a set of Stop blocks at 20 KPH isnt likely to succeed but People can do weird things during a mental episode.
As an additional safety feature, I am sure there are electronics available today that once passing a 'location', it would not allow the Train to increase its speed and could monitor the speed and if its too high, cut the power also applying the Brakes if this is not already being done so by the Driver.
This would only need to be functional at Dead ends and maybe where Derails turn a Train into an unsafe area.

Why are you so intent on blaming the driver in this instance when from early reports there was a significant mechanical failure.
The waratahs are ATP capable in any case and how about you wait for the final report before apportioning any more blame to the driver.
simstrain
Where are the reports of significant mechanical failure? if that were the case do you really think they would be fitting timed train stops?
  Valvegear Dr Beeching

Location: Norda Fittazroy
Why are you so intent on blaming the driver in this instance when from early reports there was a significant mechanical failure. The waratahs are ATP capable in any case and how about you wait for the final report before apportioning any more blame to the driver.
"sismtrain"
For God's sake read what gordon_s1942 actually wrote - not what your fevered imagination has come up with.
Nowhere did he blame the driver for the Richmond incident.
He discussed various possibilities, some unconnected (aviation) history, and an idea or two. You obviously didn't read it properly before leaping into the attack and making a fool of yourself.
  wally-wowser1 Train Controller

Location: overlooking the Mt vic washaway on Soldiers Pinch
When I started as a trainee at the college of knowledge at Petersham we had a very good instructor for our group . One of his favourite sayings referred to accidents .

Rule 1   Blame the driver .

Rule 2    No matter what else you find in the investigation with regards to mechanical  , electrical or signalling still blame the driver .

Rule 99 If the driver has  killed in the accident   we [ the railways ] are out of here  scott free   as he can be blamed & cannot appear before a investigation & give a true  position of what happened .  This has been seen in a few accidents that I know of .
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

When I started as a trainee at the college of knowledge at Petersham we had a very good instructor for our group . One of his favourite sayings referred to accidents .

Rule 1   Blame the driver .

Rule 2    No matter what else you find in the investigation with regards to mechanical  , electrical or signalling still blame the driver .

Rule 99 If the driver has  killed in the accident   we [ the railways ] are out of here  scott free   as he can be blamed & cannot appear before a investigation & give a true  position of what happened .  This has been seen in a few accidents that I know of .
wally-wowser1
well, there is the best example of driver paranoia seem in some time. Are you seriously asking us to believe that the resources of the ATSB, ONRSR and internal investigations are solely focused on proving that the fault was solely that of the driver?

Your claims slander a fine group of people.
  Lockspike Deputy Commissioner

When I started as a trainee at the college of knowledge at Petersham we had a very good instructor for our group . One of his favourite sayings referred to accidents .

Rule 1   Blame the driver .

Rule 2    No matter what else you find in the investigation with regards to mechanical  , electrical or signalling still blame the driver .

Rule 99 If the driver has  killed in the accident   we [ the railways ] are out of here  scott free   as he can be blamed & cannot appear before a investigation & give a true  position of what happened .  This has been seen in a few accidents that I know of .
wally-wowser1
In my experience "Per-Way's the blame" was a catch cry. This and W-W1's comments above are indicative of the significant blame culture that predominated. While 'Boards of Enquiry' ostensibly investigated to prevent re-occurrence, their main product was to apportion blame. These boards of enquiry were formed by the local senior officers of the branches concerned, not trained incident investigators. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that board's conclusions were often decided before the enquiry even opened. External influences on such circumstances came down to funny handshakes, what pub you drank at, and even what church you did or didn't attend.

The situation for our current rail workers is equally appalling. Dismissal with no real opportunity for fair dealing for 'upsetting our safety record'.
  wally-wowser1 Train Controller

Location: overlooking the Mt vic washaway on Soldiers Pinch
Well Well Good morning  Mr Animal . I have had no intention of doing anything that you have suggested in your last sentence .  I have seen the outcomes of internal enquiries & left wondering how some of their conclusions could hold up  . The same with a few external  ones back in the days before the current type of investigations are carried out  .  Todays investigations  are totally different to what used to happen when I first started on the job & I stand by what I have mentioned  & I am sure that LOCO members will back  up most mentioned .
  jcouch Assistant Commissioner

Location: Asleep on a commuter train
Interesting followup:  Summary, nothing easily spottable as wrong - no speeding, everyone fit & healthy, no malfunctions

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-08/sydney-train-crash-at-richmond-station-report-released/9526950
  RTT_Rules Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Dubai UAE
Interesting followup:  Summary, nothing easily spottable as wrong - no speeding, everyone fit & healthy, no malfunctions

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-08/sydney-train-crash-at-richmond-station-report-released/9526950
jcouch
So
- Train, track and environmental were all normal.
- Train was was driven within the defined rules and expectations
- Train Driver was fit and healthy, fully trained and knew the route well.

Yet we still had a train run into the buffer at enough speed to cause significant damage to the train and put people in hospital.

Swiss Cheese Effect ????
  awsgc24 Minister for Railways

Location: Sydney
A photo of the front of the trains, and the buffer stop at Richmond seems to show some energy-absorbing hydraulic(?) plungers. It this correct, though shortage of space makes in likely that little energy will be absorbed.

Do the location of points and signals at the south end of the platform, allow bigger, longer buffer stops to be installed, including, perhaps, a fixed train stop at the stopping point?

Like Lindfield on the North Shore line? Between about 1928 and 2000, it wasn't though necessary to have this fixed train stop; fixed train stops have no moving parts, and would be very cheap compared to a moving trainstop. So why did it take so long to install one?

At Hornsby, Platform 2 ends in two "open to gauge" catch point, angled so that a train getting may well be foul of the Up Main line, not that any tests were carried out.

In about 2000, Hornsby P2 was, at long last, fitted with one or (two?) intermediate timed trainstops, set at an excruciating 8km/h.

With remodelling of Hornsby in 2018, P2 was extended on straight track; were the intermediate trainstops still necessary?

Other locations they may or may not have fixed trainstops and/or timed trainstops entering a deadend, are
* Bondi Junction ESR
* Central ESR
* Martin ESR
* Kingsgrove ?
* Revesby ?
* East Hills P1 ?
* Macarthur P1 ?
* Chatswood Turnback ?
* Epping Turnback ?
* Eastwood no its, full overlap available.
* Liverpool no its, full overlap available.
  RTT_Rules Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Dubai UAE
A photo of the front of the trains, and the buffer stop at Richmond seems to show some energy-absorbing hydraulic(?) plungers. It this correct, though shortage of space makes in likely that little energy will be absorbed.

Do the location of points and signals at the south end of the platform, allow bigger, longer buffer stops to be installed, including, perhaps, a fixed train stop at the stopping point?

Like Lindfield on the North Shore line? Between about 1928 and 2000, it wasn't though necessary to have this fixed train stop; fixed train stops have no moving parts, and would be very cheap compared to a moving trainstop. So why did it take so long to install one?

At Hornsby, Platform 2 ends in two "open to gauge" catch point, angled so that a train getting may well be foul of the Up Main line, not that any tests were carried out.

In about 2000, Hornsby P2 was, at long last, fitted with one or (two?) intermediate timed trainstops, set at an excruciating 8km/h.

With remodelling of Hornsby in 2018, P2 was extended on straight track; were the intermediate trainstops still necessary?

Other locations they may or may not have fixed trainstops and/or timed trainstops entering a deadend, are
* Bondi Junction ESR
* Central ESR
* Martin ESR
* Kingsgrove ?
* Revesby ?
* East Hills P1 ?
* Macarthur P1 ?
* Chatswood Turnback ?
* Epping Turnback ?
* Eastwood no its, full overlap available.
* Liverpool no its, full overlap available.
awsgc24
Looking at the Google Maps, the train fits on the station with barely a few metres buffer. In the past trains were shorter and thus had this natural buffer but with a ~160m long train to fit on a
  KRviator Moderator

Location: Up the front
- Train, track and environmental were all normal.
RTT_Rules
The report doesn't say the train behaved normally. It simply says the train was intact and there was no evidence of rail head contamination. It also doesn't say the train was operated in accordance with extant rules and procedures, rather just that he knew them and was qualified for the route.

It would have helped matters immensely if the ATSB had included a screenshot of the datalogger parameters they downloaded. To do that takes all of 5 minutes from the time you actually get the file in hand, and I'm wondering why they didn't choose to include that.

Have a look at page 12 of the Preliminary report for the QR IMU that wen't off the end at Cleveland. That datalog extract shows everything you need to know to understand what happened. But not necessarily the why though.
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

ATSB report on this crash here: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5777209/ro-2018-004_final.pdf

SMH summary of Report: https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/dark-and-dizzy-sydney-trains-driver-recalls-moments-before-crash-20191230-p53njq.html
georges
yes well here i am waiting to see wally and sims apologise
  SinickleBird Chief Train Controller

Location: Qantas Club at Mudgee International Airport
I don’t think anyone could, in conscience, blame the driver for having some form of medical episode.

What I find astonishing is the persistent objection to the concept of ‘driverless trains’ on safety grounds, when the safety recommendations from an incident such as this one are that trains should be equipped with ATP systems which (a) exist on driverless trains as standard, and (b) take over control of the situation when driver error or medical issues create unsafe situations.

An impartial space alien would surely conclude that the probability of computer error endangering safety is lower than the probability of human operation endangering safety.

Greetings from planet Zog (my holiday destination)
  justapassenger Chief Commissioner

I don’t think anyone could, in conscience, blame the driver for having some form of medical episode.
SinickleBird
Especially one that would result in his occupation being taken away from him until further notice.

I hope that he has had some progress towards diagnosing and treating his condition, and that Sydney Trains have worked to find him an alternative role without safety critical responsibilities until his condition has been treated.

This is a case where CCTV in the cab (as recommended in the report) could have been handy, as it may have helped the driver's medical team with diagnosing his condition.

What I find astonishing is the persistent objection to the concept of ‘driverless trains’ on safety grounds, when the safety recommendations from an incident such as this one are that trains should be equipped with ATP systems which (a) exist on driverless trains as standard, and (b) take over control of the situation when driver error or medical issues create unsafe situations.

An impartial space alien would surely conclude that the probability of computer error endangering safety is lower than the probability of human operation endangering safety.
SinickleBird
Your impartial space alien mates would be pleased to learn that ETCS Level 2 (the ATP system selected for Sydney) even includes a series of fail-to-safe measures to ensure that when errors do happen they do not compromise the safety of the passengers.

Speaking of the human operation, the report is not good reading for the guard. Twice the train went over the maximum line speed without any intervention, he gave an early departure from one stop (not a safety error, but maybe a clue as to his state of mind) and then didn't realise the train was hurtling into the station until it was two seconds away from hitting the buffers.

I'm willing to be corrected if I'm wrong, but the report seems to indicate that the NSW government is dawdling on the full ETCS rollout as the completion date keeps getting pushed back. Time for them to get serious about finishing the job.
  s3_gunzel Not a gunzel developer

Location: Western Sydney, AU
Speaking of the human operation, the report is not good reading for the guard. Twice the train went over the maximum line speed without any intervention, he gave an early departure from one stop (not a safety error, but maybe a clue as to his state of mind) and then didn't realise the train was hurtling into the station until it was two seconds away from hitting the buffers.
justapassenger
One instance was less than 5kph, and by the time he'd have checked the train speed on his single-screen which was most likely on the DVA screen, it would have been underspeed.
  KRviator Moderator

Location: Up the front
Your impartial space alien mates would be pleased to learn that ETCS Level 2 (the ATP system selected for Sydney) even includes a series of fail-to-safe measures to ensure that when errors do happen they do not compromise the safety of the passengers.
justapassenger
Except ETCS L2 permits overspeeding by 5km/hr before it sounds the ATP Overspeed alarm, and will not initiate a penalty brake application until 8kph over the governed speed.

Speaking of the human operation, the report is not good reading for the guard. Twice the train went over the maximum line speed without any intervention, he gave an early departure from one stop (not a safety error, but maybe a clue as to his state of mind) and then didn't realise the train was hurtling into the station until it was two seconds away from hitting the buffers.
justapassenger
Overspeed by 3kph for 5 seconds and 2kph for 2 seconds and you expect a Guard to pick up on that? Are you serious or just taking the pi$$? As above, even ETCS L2 wouldn't get upset by that, and you expect a Guard to?

AIUI, a Guard can give the rightaway upto 30 seconds prior to the allocated departure time, the doors closed at .27 the train departed at .29, so I'd say that was within the tolerance given - particularly as there was no correlation of times used by the Guard to dispatch the train and the datalogger. If you want to quibble about something like that to try to spear the Guard for his inaction, I think you need some more time in an operational environment.
  RTT_Rules Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Dubai UAE
I don’t think anyone could, in conscience, blame the driver for having some form of medical episode.
Especially one that would result in his occupation being taken away from him until further notice.

I hope that he has had some progress towards diagnosing and treating his condition, and that Sydney Trains have worked to find him an alternative role without safety critical responsibilities until his condition has been treated.

This is a case where CCTV in the cab (as recommended in the report) could have been handy, as it may have helped the driver's medical team with diagnosing his condition.

What I find astonishing is the persistent objection to the concept of ‘driverless trains’ on safety grounds, when the safety recommendations from an incident such as this one are that trains should be equipped with ATP systems which (a) exist on driverless trains as standard, and (b) take over control of the situation when driver error or medical issues create unsafe situations.

An impartial space alien would surely conclude that the probability of computer error endangering safety is lower than the probability of human operation endangering safety.
Your impartial space alien mates would be pleased to learn that ETCS Level 2 (the ATP system selected for Sydney) even includes a series of fail-to-safe measures to ensure that when errors do happen they do not compromise the safety of the passengers.

Speaking of the human operation, the report is not good reading for the guard. Twice the train went over the maximum line speed without any intervention, he gave an early departure from one stop (not a safety error, but maybe a clue as to his state of mind) and then didn't realise the train was hurtling into the station until it was two seconds away from hitting the buffers.

I'm willing to be corrected if I'm wrong, but the report seems to indicate that the NSW government is dawdling on the full ETCS rollout as the completion date keeps getting pushed back. Time for them to get serious about finishing the job.
justapassenger
My employer installed CCTV on all our Pot Tending Machines (Very expensive gantry cranes) last year, first as a controversial trial in one area only and the operators were told. You can see the operations on the floor including the driver and any floor based people. After just one month of WTF are these guys doing when not being watched and realisation that blames for certain issues were completely incorrect we rolled out CCTV to entire both sites. Safety is improving as a result, so yes I believe it should be rolled more were manual operations are involved.

Yes, the ongoing opposition to Automation and excuses used are mind blowing. We should be seeing the DD network converted to full computer supervision and override when the driver deviates outside the tolerance. Not sure sure how it works running into dead ends though.

Yes, humans are humans and medical conditions can occur at anytime.
  YM-Mundrabilla Minister for Railways

Location: Mundrabilla but I'd rather be in Narvik
Fit MCAS (available cheap from Boeing) on every train. NFI* wot it stands for.

By all means adopt everything reasonable to assist crews and enhance safety but first and foremost you must have competent, experienced, diligent and conscientious crews.

They say in aviation that the first rule is 'Fly the Plane'. Perhaps in rail it should be 'Drive the Train'.

'Except ETCS L2 permits overspeeding by 5km/hr before it sounds the ATP Overspeed alarm, and will not initiate a penalty brake application until 8kph over the governed speed.'

These limits one would be battling to maintain in a car without being consistently significantly under the speed limits and one would think that this would be doubly difficult on a spark and damned near impossible on a heavy freight train.

Is ETCS a European thing? If so how do European and Australian operational standards compare? ATP (*NFI) is, no doubt, something to do with tennis at the moment.

Yes, I know that I am a dinosaur but, at least, I like to think that I can still communicate in English.

(* Not faintest idea Smile)
  SupremeLeaderSmeagol Locomotive Driver

Fit MCAS (available cheap from Boeing) on every train. NFI* wot it stands for.

By all means adopt everything reasonable to assist crews and enhance safety but first and foremost you must have competent, experienced, diligent and conscientious crews.

They say in aviation that the first rule is 'Fly the Plane'. Perhaps in rail it should be 'Drive the Train'.

'Except ETCS L2 permits overspeeding by 5km/hr before it sounds the ATP Overspeed alarm, and will not initiate a penalty brake application until 8kph over the governed speed.'

These limits one would be battling to maintain in a car without being consistently significantly under the speed limits and one would think that this would be doubly difficult on a spark and damned near impossible on a heavy freight train.

Is ETCS a European thing? If so how do European and Australian operational standards compare? ATP (*NFI) is, no doubt, something to do with tennis at the moment.

Yes, I know that I am a dinosaur but, at least, I like to think that I can still communicate in English.

(* Not faintest idea Smile)
YM-Mundrabilla
How is MCAS relevant? It was the same software installed on the 737-Max...
  Valvegear Dr Beeching

Location: Norda Fittazroy
How is MCAS relevant? It was the same software installed on the 737-Max...
"SupremeLeaderSmeagol"
It's called irony, son. Why do you think they're readily available and cheap?

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