Derailment at Adelaide Parklands

 
  NSWGR8022 Chief Commissioner

Location: From the lands of Journalism and Free Speech

A crash involving two freight trains near the Keswick train station caused a derailment and long traffic delays. Photo: Naomi Jellicoe.


A LEVEL crossing at Forestville is still blocked but another at Goodwood has now reopened after a freight train crashed at the Adelaide Parklands Terminal, Keswick, this morning.

A freight train coming in to Adelaide crashed into the back of another freight train near the terminal about 7.45am. Witnesses reported hearing a loud metal bang at the time.

The crash left one of the trains stranded on the tracks over level crossings at Forestville and Goodwood.


Carriages were left broken and sprawled across the tracks after the crash. Photo: Naomi Jellicoe.

Level crossings at Leader St, Forestville, and Victoria St, Goodwood, were closed for several hours. Victoria St has now reopened.

The crash caused traffic chaos earlier this morning around both level crossings but police have since blocked Leader and Victoria streets and traffic congestion has now eased.

The collision forced empty train carriages to derail and break up over the tracks. At least one of the carriages came to rest at 90 degrees to the track.

The crossings at Forestville is expected to be closed for most of the morning while crews work to clear the tracks.
Commuters are advised to avoid the area.

Adelaide Metro passenger services and Great Southern Rail were not affected by the derailment but at least two bus services were diverted. There were no reported injuries.

Australian Rail Track Corporation and Australian Transport Safety Bureau officers are investigating.

Transport company SCT Logistics said one of its general freight trains had been involved in an “incident” at the Keswick terminal and also would be investigating.

“At this stage, the company’s position is there has been an incident with one of our trains,” Chief operating officer Andrew Williams said.

“We will work with authorities to investigate the cause of the incident.

“It’s a fairly recent scene and there’s always conflicting views and information to review.”
He said the freight train was not carrying dangerous goods.

It is understood it was carrying electrical goods, including refrigerators.

A Leader St cafe, which sits next to a crossing blocked by the train, was in the thick of the chaos this morning.
Cafe Leader owner Andrew Williams said it was a normal day of trade until he heard a “loud rail yard shunting sound”.
“We were here trading as normal when we heard that sound,” he said.

“Trains sometimes stop across the crossing when things are banked up but they get cleared fairly quickly.

“But today it sounded different - it was a loud rail yard shunting sound as the wagons stopped suddenly.

“Then there was traffic in the street everywhere, waiting for the drama to end. People were trying to turn around and it was chaos.

“It just went on and on. It’s never happened here before.”

Sponsored advertisement

  bingley hall Minister for Railways

Location: Last train to Skaville
For those seeking tales of doom and gloom there are two westbound PN freights held at loops in the Hills and one eastbound PN held at Islington.

SCT's 1PM9 is sitting in the loop at Two Wells.

They will have to make a call on The Overland very soon (if not already done) as nothing is moving yet.
  bingley hall Minister for Railways

Location: Last train to Skaville
Looks like 2MP9 has backed up and gone through the passenger terminal which would clear the way for The Overland.
  Typhon Assistant Commissioner

Location: I'm that freight train tearing through the sky in the clouds.
That train being a Perth service would it have well wagons in the consist?

Anyone know what other trains will be delayed?  What about east bound services from Adelaide?
NSWGR8022

Trains indirectly affected include but not limited to: PN services 2MP5 (hearing 3AP5 is departing AFT shortly), 2MX2, 7PM5, then potentially 2MA8 and I think there's a 3AM5?
  bingley hall Minister for Railways

Location: Last train to Skaville
Overland on its way in.

Bit of congestion out north as 1PM9 can't access Penfield until 2MP9 is out of the way.
  mclaren2007 Assistant Commissioner

Location: recharging my myki
Possible SPAD?
  62430 Assistant Commissioner

Location: Metro Adelaide
Looks like 2MP9 has backed up and gone through the passenger terminal which would clear the way for The Overland.
bingley hall
The tail of 2MP9 was about 50m N of Victoria Ave but gates were down at 1400.  At 1415 2MP9 started to set back and stopped at the junction signal at Showground station. About 1440 slowly negotiated its way through Keswick Terminal and cleared Leader St at 1450.  Gates opened once the 1450 Seaford headed south.  2MP9 was headed by SCT009/011/012.

Alex C
  JoppaJunction Chief Train Controller

Location: Banned
As at this morning can we assume the track is back to normal?
  bingley hall Minister for Railways

Location: Last train to Skaville
As at this morning can we assume the track is back to normal?
JoppaJunction
As of 1930hrs yesterday evening in fact.
  justapassenger Minister for Railways

There's no pending investigation for this one showing on the ATSB website as of 11am today, but anyone in need of some bedtime reading material will be pleased to hear that the final reports on the SCT derailment at Malbooma and the GWA fire at Snowtown were both released last week.

I expect that there will be pressure on the ATSB to prioritise the investigation into yesterday's collision due to the high profile nature of the incident, which would have a preliminary report out in about 3-5 months.
  Pressman Spirit of the Vine

Location: Wherever the Tin Chook or Qantas takes me
There's no pending investigation for this one showing on the ATSB website as of 11am today, but anyone in need of some bedtime reading material will be pleased to hear that the final reports on the SCT derailment at Malbooma and the GWA fire at Snowtown were both released last week.

I expect that there will be pressure on the ATSB to prioritise the investigation into yesterday's collision due to the high profile nature of the incident, which would have a preliminary report out in about 3-5 months.
justapassenger
There is one now http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/rair/ro-2015-007.aspx

(complete with a typo!)

Summary
At about 0730 (CDT) on 31 April 2015, intermodal freight train 2MP9, operated by Specialised Container Transport, passed signal No. 1 displaying a 'Proceed at low speed, prepare to stop indication' at the southern end of the Mile End Loop in South Australia.

Train 2MP9 proceeded past the signal No. 1, at low speed, but subsequently collided with the rear end of intermodal freight train 2MP1, operated by Aurizon, that was at stop on the Main Line waiting to depart.

There were no injuries to the train crew of either train and while there was only minor damage to train 2MP9, train 2MP1 incurred substantial impact damage to wagons along the length of the train with three wagons fully derailed.
  JoppaJunction Chief Train Controller

Location: Banned
There is one now http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/rair/ro-2015-007.aspx

(complete with a typo!)

Summary
At about 0730 (CDT) on 31 April 2015, intermodal freight train 2MP9, operated by Specialised Container Transport, passed signal No. 1 displaying a 'Proceed at low speed, prepare to stop indication' at the southern end of the Mile End Loop in South Australia.

Train 2MP9 proceeded past the signal No. 1, at low speed, but subsequently collided with the rear end of intermodal freight train 2MP1, operated by Aurizon, that was at stop on the Main Line waiting to depart.

There were no injuries to the train crew of either train and while there was only minor damage to train 2MP9, train 2MP1 incurred substantial impact damage to wagons along the length of the train with three wagons fully derailed.
Pressman

Not being familiar with the area was signal 1 advising there was another train in the section be prepared to stop short?

What is a prepare to stop indication?
  Pressman Spirit of the Vine

Location: Wherever the Tin Chook or Qantas takes me
Not being familiar with the area was signal 1 advising there was another train in the section be prepared to stop short?

What is a prepare to stop indication?
JoppaJunction
refer to this diagram http://www.sa-trackandsignal.net/Pdf%20files/ARTC/AR102.pdf

Signal 1 is between Leader St. LC and the Anzac Hwy over bridge.
Point #5 is the southern entrance to the passenger terminal.
The collision occurred between signal 4 and the zero Datum point
  Aaron The Ghost of George Stephenson

Location: University of Adelaide SA
There is one now http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/rair/ro-2015-007.aspx

(complete with a typo!)

Summary
At about 0730 (CDT) on 31 April 2015, intermodal freight train 2MP9, operated by Specialised Container Transport, passed signal No. 1 displaying a 'Proceed at low speed, prepare to stop indication' at the southern end of the Mile End Loop in South Australia.

Train 2MP9 proceeded past the signal No. 1, at low speed, but subsequently collided with the rear end of intermodal freight train 2MP1, operated by Aurizon, that was at stop on the Main Line waiting to depart.

There were no injuries to the train crew of either train and while there was only minor damage to train 2MP9, train 2MP1 incurred substantial impact damage to wagons along the length of the train with three wagons fully derailed.
Pressman
I am willing to overlook typos, since, in this case they actually managed to launch the investigation in the correct state.
  David Peters Dr Beeching

Location: "With Hey Boy".
I have been told by a source close to the action that a point failed and did not move across and instead of passing the other train it collided with the rear end of it. I was told it was at low speed as well approx 20Kmh or thereabouts! Just lucky it was not a lot faster though in this particular case and also lucky that no one was injured either in the collision!
  steam4ian Chief Commissioner

The switch changing is only a side issue.
True, getting low speed indication the driver might have expected to go into the loop not the main line.

However, a low speed indication is just that, read shunting speed, the speed at which you can stop your train in half the distance you can see ahead, it has no absolute speed value.

What I suspect is that the driver misjudged the distance between his train and the one ahead. Understandable in that the rear vehicles of the train in front were flats and the only visible indication of the rear of the train would have been the white disc. The most visible item was a blue container about 4-5 cars ahead of the train's rear. Consider also it was 0720 CDT and the actual rear of the train, the white disc, was most likely in the shade of the trackside plantings.

Perhaps we need brake vans and Adlake lanterns.

Ian
  NG Sulzers Deputy Commissioner

Location: Quorn
There is an absolute speed associated with a Low Speed Signal.

Proceed at a Speed that you can stop in half the distance you can see clear, or 25km/h, whichever is the lesser of the two.
  DalyWaters Chief Commissioner



What I suspect is that the driver misjudged the distance

Ian
steam4ian
Not a good idea to expound here on what you "suspect".

It can only make you look like an idiot when the ATSB report is released.
  steam4ian Chief Commissioner

DalyWaters

This a free forum in a free country I can suspect what I like and write what I like provided it is not offensive like implying somebody is an idiot.

I will stand by my logic no matter what the Board might find. The Board will obviously have more facts at their disposal than I and therefore quite likely could find differently.

I can receive the ATSB findings without any embarrassment.

Ian
  Alco_Haulic Chief Commissioner

Location: Eating out...
There is an absolute speed associated with a Low Speed Signal.

Proceed at a Speed that you can stop in half the distance you can see clear, or 25km/h, whichever is the lesser of the two.
NG Sulzers
Just checked the ARTC paperwork, and "Slow Speed" is defined as no more than 15km/h. I saw no mention of the old stop in half visible distance, however it would most likely still be enforced.
  seb2351 Chief Commissioner

Location: Sydney
Just checked the ARTC paperwork, and "Slow Speed" is defined as no more than 15km/h. I saw no mention of the old stop in half visible distance, however it would most likely still be enforced.
Alco_Haulic
For those qualified in Network code of practice, and therefore qualified to make such a statement with confidence, are currently chuckling at the interpretation of the signal.
There is no slow speed signal. There is however an incorrectly identified low speed signal (as the official report states- shock horror!)

The actual signal is a Lowspeed/calling on signal, as identified by the small illuminated yellow subsidiary shunt signal below the 2 main reds, on an absolute.  (page 29 of the rules)
The definition and method of passing such signal displaying such a condition is:

"Proceed restricted authority- the block ahead may be occupied or obstructed. Proceed at low speed. Prepare to stop short of an obstruction"

Low speed is defined as "s a speed which will enable a train movement to be stopped within half the distance that the line is seen to be clear ahead, but which does not exceed 25 km/h".
  KRviator Moderator

Location: Up the front
And with that final comment from someone who does actually know the rules, this will be reopened when the report comes out.
  dthead Site Admin

Location: Melbourne, Australia
And with that final comment from someone who does actually know the rules, this will be reopened when the report comes out.
KRviator



The ATSB final report is now out and available at

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/rair/ro-2015-007.aspx.

(Info provided by a Railpage member and not myself)
  bevans Site Admin

Location: Melbourne, Australia
What the ATSB found

The ATSB determined that the signalling and communications systems were operating correctly and as designed.

The investigation found that the driver of train 2MP9, on receiving a ‘Calling on/Low speed’ signal indication, proceeded at a speed not greater than 25 km/h, but was unable to stop the train, ‘within half the distance the line ahead was clear’, as prescribed by the operational rules. The driver was aware that the operational rules stipulate that ‘block ahead may be occupied or obstructed’, but did not expect that train 2MP1 was stationary on the track so close ahead. As he approached train 2MP1, some stumpy vegetation and a low fence initially obscured his view of the empty flat wagons at the rear of the train. When the driver finally saw the rear of train 2MP1, he immediately made an emergency brake application, but was unable to stop the train before it collided with 2MP1.

The ATSB noted that the pathing of a train by a network control officer (NCO) onto a line occupied by a preceding train, when an alternate route is available and not obstructed, presents an elevated level of risk. Similarly, well thought out and clear communications between an NCO and crew of an approaching train, as to the proximity of a train occupying the track ahead, can significantly enhance situational awareness and reduce operational risk.
  Pressman Spirit of the Vine

Location: Wherever the Tin Chook or Qantas takes me
What the ATSB found

The ATSB determined that the signalling and communications systems were operating correctly and as designed.

The investigation found that the driver of train 2MP9, on receiving a ‘Calling on/Low speed’ signal indication, proceeded at a speed not greater than 25 km/h, but was unable to stop the train, ‘within half the distance the line ahead was clear’, as prescribed by the operational rules. The driver was aware that the operational rules stipulate that ‘block ahead may be occupied or obstructed’, but did not expect that train 2MP1 was stationary on the track so close ahead. As he approached train 2MP1, some stumpy vegetation and a low fence initially obscured his view of the empty flat wagons at the rear of the train. When the driver finally saw the rear of train 2MP1, he immediately made an emergency brake application, but was unable to stop the train before it collided with 2MP1.

The ATSB noted that the pathing of a train by a network control officer (NCO) onto a line occupied by a preceding train, when an alternate route is available and not obstructed, presents an elevated level of risk. Similarly, well thought out and clear communications between an NCO and crew of an approaching train, as to the proximity of a train occupying the track ahead, can significantly enhance situational awareness and reduce operational risk.
bevans


Also of note..........

Contributing factors

The train was travelling too fast for the prevailing conditions and the driver of train 2MP9 did not see the rear of train 2MP1 in sufficient time to stop and avoid the collision.

The driver of 2MP9 was unaware, and did not expect that train 2MP1 was stationary on the track ahead.

Vegetation and a low fence adjacent the Mile End crossing loop partially obscured the view that the crew of train 2MP9 had of the empty flat wagons at the rear of train 2MP1. [Safety issue]

The practice of pathing a following train onto a line occupied by a preceding train, when an alternate route was available and not obstructed, presented an elevated level of risk. [Safety issue]

Other factors that increased risk

The practice of pathing a following train onto the same line occupied by a preceding train, without pre-warning the driver regarding the train ahead, presented an elevated level of risk. [Safety issue]

The design of the NTCS in screening Adelaide metro broadcast communications prevented the driver of 2MP9 from gaining an appreciation of activities close to his area of operation, in particular the position of train 2MP1 along the Mile End main line. [Safety issue]

National Train Communications System (NTCS) – Broadcast communicationsThe design of the NTCS in screening Adelaide metro broadcast communications prevented the driver of 2MP9 from gaining an appreciation of activities close to his area of operation, in particular the position of train 2MP1 along the Mile End main line.
Rail Safety issue No: RO-2015-007-SI-05


It was also interesting to read that ATSB directed a safety issue at ARTC ....
"Vegetation and a low fence adjacent the Mile End crossing loop partially obscured the view that the crew of train 2MP9 had of the empty flat wagons at the rear of train 2MP1."
To which ARTC responded with
The vegetation is located on private property(that is NOT ARTC Property)

Sponsored advertisement

Display from:   

Quick Reply

We've disabled Quick Reply for this thread as it was last updated more than six months ago.